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P.S. DELORIA*

Indian Natural Resource Issues in an

Orderly System
Indian tribes will be posing-and facing-a number of issues in the
future having to do with land and natural resources. A few tribes have
unresolved claims to ownership of land now claimed by others. Many tribes
have not yet fully established the measure of their water rights. Tribes are
asking for a share of the power generated by hydroelectric projects on their
former lands. Tribes will acquire land both on and off reservations. Tribal
efforts to protect hunting and fishing rights on and off reservations will
continue and intensify as use of the resources by non-Indians increases.
And tribes will press for continued access to sacred sites throughout their
traditional areas and to protect these sites from development.
Like all Indian issues, Indian natural resource issues are
characteristically viewed either as just like other issues, manageable in
exactly the same ways, or as so unique as to be virtually intractable. Seen in
the proper context, their uniqueness and their ordinariness stand out in
better perspective and make them easier to understand and to deal with.
The prevailing view is that Indians hold the wild card in an otherwise
orderly natural resource system, staking out an exceptionality that raises
havoc with public policy. "Wild card" is not a good metaphor, since a wild
card is played by a player in the game; Indians are viewed as non-players
who can whimsically alter the game from the outside with only minimal
regard for the rules. This view skews the picture toward the uniqueness of
Indian issues and makes them more difficult than they in fact are.
The focus needs to be on the system of managing issues and not on
the "Indian-ness" of the issue. Although many natural resource issues in the
larger society are strictly between private parties, the resolution of such
issues is by and largd a matter of governmental action as the government
defines and helps to enforce rights. If it is assumed that issues will be
managed or resolved only by the state or federal governments, then Indians
will always be the kibitzers affecting the game from the outside. If, on the
other hand, it is assumed that Indian tribes are part of the management
system as players at the table, then the zone of "uniqueness" surrounding
Indian issues becomes much smaller and easier to manage.
The evolution of western water rights provides an example. In one
sense, perhaps, the assertion of tribal water rights functions as a wild card
in an otherwise more or less orderly system, possibly threatening what are
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viewed as established claims and throwing a monkey wrench into the
inevitable transition from small agricultural use to agribusiness, industrial,
and residential uses in some parts of the West. But in what sense is a
myopic system an "orderly system"? It is an orderly and rational system
only if one assumes that the Indians will never seek to establish their rights
and that federal policy will continue to consist of helping non-Indians to
maximize their water use while keeping the Indians out of the game.
Everyone in the West has known for a hundred years that Indians
have had unquantified water rights and undetermined priorities. Yet
throughout this period, federal and state governments have pursued water
policies that could only be considered orderly, rational, and realistic if one
assumed that Indian rights would never have to be dealt with. The
perception of what is the Indians' "fair share" today is obviously affected
by one's view of this evolutionary process. If one views the Indians as
whimsical latecomers to the game, then every drop of oversubscribed water
that goes to them will seem to come from someone with an "established"
right. But if one sees that many of the "established" rights would never
have been established if the Indian rights had been included in the "orderly
process" from the outset, the perceptions of fairness are likely to be quite
different.
Taxation and regulatory policies, including tribal levies on various
Indian resources, provide other examples. We live in a federal system in
which state governments use their taxing and regulatory authority to
balance economic considerations with other public policy matters, such as
environmental protection, consumer protection, and fair labor standards.
One important consideration in these balancing acts is the competition
among the states for investment dollars. Policy decisions by one state and
more favorable conditions in another state can drive investment out. States
can choose to sacrifice tax dollars in one area in the hope of attracting
investments that will generate revenues in another area. Although states
may be critical of each others' policies, they adjust as necessary because
they understand that they live in a federal system in which state
government competition is a permanent part. This system would be more
"orderly" if all taxation and regulatory regimes were uniform throughout
the nation. The variety of approaches is not considered a sign of disorder
but rather is accepted as a desirable feature of a federal system.
Indian tribes have been considered a threat to the orderly system,
especially in the last forty years (roughly since the end of the Termination
Era of federal Indian policy) when they abandoned the patterns with which
the larger society had become familiar. The "Indian issues" of the modem
era are the result of these as yet unassimilated new patterns of behavior.
Under the old system, Indian tribes passively allowed non-Indians to put
their land and resources into production. Tribes acted as landowners, not
governments; acquiesced in federal decisions to use leases and similar
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instruments to define the tribal role and establish the benefits to the tribe;
and allowed the federal government to decide which Indian rights would
be pursued and when. Since the early 1960s, tribes have largely abandoned
this old pattern. They have insisted on a greater role in making decisions
about land and natural resource use and development. They have
sometimes even taken resources out of production or refused to lease them.
Most importantly, they have greatly expanded their roles as governments,
imposing taxes and regulations on old leases and insisting that new
development projects accommodate the possibility of changing tribal
taxation and regulatory policies-much as do other governments
throughout the world. The bitter legal debate over Indian severance taxes
on oil and gas production under federal leases in the 1970s and early 1980s
marked the new emergence of tribes exercising old governmental powers.
The role shift from landowner to government with respect to
natural resources and their management has not been the only significant
change. As tribes have assumed control over their own resource policies,
they have not always met the stereotypes held by the non-Indian society. In
some instances, such as when tribes oppose strip mines on cultural and
environmental grounds, tribal policies have been pleasing to the larger
society, or at least to influential interest groups. In other cases, tribes have
departed from the stereotype by exploring projects with possibly high
environmental impact, such as toxic waste dumps, massive pig farms, and
high-density residential developments. Whether pleasing or not is beyond
the point; tribes make the choices as governments.
Between the mid-1970s and mid-1980s, the American Indian Law
Center, Inc., helped to create and provided the staff support for an
organization called the Commission on State-Tribal Relations. During a
decade of examining tribal-state-municipal inter-governmental
relationships on and near Indian reservations, a number of important
lessons were learned, particularly about attitudes affecting governmental
behavior. When a tribe adopted tax and regulatory standards identical to
those of neighboring governments, thus having net zero competitive
impact, they were regarded as being good neighbors, causing no
problems-in effect, they were not considered a wild card. When a tribe
adopted higher taxation and regulatory standards, driving investment off
the reservation, they were regarded as Noble Savages, adhering to values
higher than mere moneymaking. And when they adopted standards that
would attract investment, they were denounced as greedy Indians who
were peddling their sovereignty. A realistic view of the "orderly process"
must in fairness recognize that all policies designed to attract investment,
whether by state, federal, or tribal governments, involve peddling
sovereignty. Any of these policy decisions may be bad social policy,
inefficient, or vulnerable to other criticisms. But to paraphrase the old joke,
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we know they all peddle sovereignty; now we are merely haggling about
the price.
One might wonder how the view of Indians as a wild card came
about. The first answer lies in the essential ambiguity-some might say
hypocrisy--of federal Indian policy. From the very beginning, Indian tribes
were dealt with as sovereign entities and were promised, more or less
explicitly, a permanent political, social, and governmental existence. At the
same time, the very same officials, from the President on down who were
telling the tribes what they wanted to hear, were publicly doubting the
advisability and viability of permanent tribal existence and planning and
implementing various schemes for extermination, removal, acculturation,
and assimilation, often in the most dishonorable terms. These contradictory
policies were communicated to the society at large and in many respects
mirrored the views of that society. These policies provided the basis for the
fundamental attitude that tribal governments are not a permanent part of
the American governmental landscape but a temporary expedient to
facilitate assimilation. To a large extent, pro-tribal federal policies were
simply filtered out of the American consciousness. Because of the
assimilationist policies, states were encouraged to believe that some day
they would inherit the mantle of government in reservation areas. The
tribes would be stripped bare of their governmental jurisdiction over all of
their resources.
The second major cause of competition between tribal and state
governments can be traced to the McBratney case, in which the Supreme
Court held that crimes among non-Indians in Indian country are subject to
state and not federal law. The significance of McBratney for the evolution of
governance of Indian reservations is that it destroyed the territorial integrity
of Indian country and thus destroyed tribal control of its most basic natural
resource.
The judicial branch accorded to itself enormous power to determine
in any given case whether an assertion of state power transgressed the
limits of the federal government's Indian power and the corresponding
power of tribes to govern themselves. From the day of McBratney on,
federal courts have greatly expanded their legislative activities under the
guise of making Federal Common Law, drawing lines between federal (and
tribal) and state power as it suits them. Since none of these lines has been
drawn on constitutional grounds, the plenary power of Congress appears
to remain intact, while the Court has sharply reduced the effective scope of
preemption of state powers on reservations by seeming to interpret the
intent of Congress. Congress could have responded to McBratneyby passing
legislation explicitly federalizing all crimes in Indian country in order to

1 United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1882).
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maintain peace and protect the Indians, which would have reduced the role
of the judiciary to map reading rather than drawing Platonic lines between
governmental interests. But it did not choose to correct McBratney, and
states and tribes have been engaged ever since in a competition to govern
the same territory. Of course Congress's lack of response to McBratney is far
from its only contribution to the present situation. Its various schemes over
the years to open reservations, sell off "surplus" lands to non-Indians, and
allow the sale of allotments have complicated the demographics of many
reservations probably beyond repair.
The third source of competition between tribes and states lies in the
notion of the public interest. Congress has the constitutional duty to
promote the public interest, but over the course of the years this vague
admonition seems to have been regarded by the courts as only an
underlying duty. One might suppose that the federal commitment to
continued recognition of Indian tribes and the consequent legal and
political ramifications of that decision were determinations by Congress
made in the public interest, not in conflict with it.
But since Nixon's 1970 Message To Congress on Indians admitted
to a federal conflict of interest between the duty to the Indians and the duty
to the larger public interest, the federal government has been engaged in a
balancing act. The tendency became-and still persists to this day-to
identify any non-Indian interest opposing that of the Indians with the
general public interest, thereby setting up a conflict that may not have
needed to exist.
To give an example from the natural resources area, during the
complicated working out of the Maine Indian land claim in the 1960s and
1970s, some elements of the Justice Department felt that their responsibility
to the tribes bringing the land claim created a conflict of interest for the
federal government. When pressed, they could not readily identify the
federal responsibility that conflicted with that to the Indians. At one point,
they identified a duty to the State of Maine, which is clearly not the case,
because the State of Maine, as a state, is provided for in the Constitution
and can be expected to take care of itself. At another point, they identified
the people of the State of Maine who, insofar as they are distinguishable
from the rest of the people of the United States, could be expected to be
taken care of by the State of Maine. Finally, they fell back on the Public
Interest as the source of their conflict. As it happened, the tribes had
identified only the State of Maine and several timber companies as being
the target of their claims, and if the tribes were successful only the State and
the timber companies would have had to come up with land or money to
satisfy the claim. In effect, then, the Carter Administration Justice
Department had identified the Public Interest with the private commercial
interests of several timber companies.
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To be sure, the public interest may often be embodied in the
interests of private parties, or, put another way, it is almost certain that
some private party will benefit from government decisions made in the
public interest. But this public thinking-out-loud in the Carter
Administration (which in the end, despite its misgivings, helped contribute
to a successful solution to the problem in Maine) tended to suggest that
anyone with a problem against an Indian tribe automatically qualified as
embodying the public interest of the people of the United States against that
of the Indians.
There is a tendency in state government as well to see uncritically
any non-Indian interests opposed to the Indians as representing those of the
state at large, making it difficult for the state government to identify with
and support tribal interests against virtually any non-Indian opposition.
This structural problem and its impact on governmental attitudes has been
at the root of the attitude of many states and tribes; there are or can be two
separate economies, Indian and non-Indian, such that a dollar going to one
is a dollar deprived to the other. These attitudes set up ruinous competition
between states and tribes on economic matters where they might often find
their interests to coincide and where both might have much more to worry
about in their competition with other states and countries.
The work of the State-Tribal Commission revealed two models of
intergovernmental relationships serving reservations that can serve as
overall models for the resolution of natural resource issues. An immature
and unhealthy tribal-state relationship, it seems, is one in which the
governments contest power for the sake of power. No attention is paid to
whether the standards by which a tribe or a state might govern are
unacceptable; the only question is which government is entitled to make the
decision. Thus, in many states-New Mexico especially-activities on the
reservation that are not subject to state taxation or regulation are
characteristically referred to by the press and elected officials as "untaxed"
or "unregulated," meaning untaxed or unregulated by the state, as if the
tribe had made no policy decision regarding taxes or regulations. Accepting
the permanence and legitimacy of the federal system and their fellow states,
the local press and government officials may complain about neighboring
state policies that affect them, but not as if the other state governments
constitute a government vacuum.
This competitive model of state-tribal relations encourages each
government to see the other as a wild card. The states dream of the day
when they no longer have to deal with tribal governments, and the tribes
dream of the day when the states are at least driven back to the original
reservation boundaries and the tribes need only negotiate power-sharing
with the federal government. Both sides are dreaming. Congress lacks the
political will to break the deadlock definitively, either trying to abolish
tribal government or restoring its territorial integrity and confirming full
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tribal power over non-Indians. Nevertheless, state and tribal governments
in this model are not encouraged to engage each other but instead are
encouraged to constantly seek federal intervention in their favor in any
forum that shows promise--Congress, the courts, or executive agencies.
The flaw in this approach is that, as long as the two forms of
government exist, federal support for one side on one issue or another
results only in minor adjustments of power. Regardless of the outcome,
tribes and states will have to confront their relationship and deal with each
other's independence. Although it makes a difference whether the line

between the governments is drawn at the original reservation boundary or
at the edge of each piece of trust land, the same questions must be
addressed by each government in either case.
Ironically, the last thing the states should want is the termination
of the federal-tribal relationship and the abolition of tribal governments.
Indians bring huge amounts of federal money into states by virtue of their
Indian status, and most of it finds its way into the off-reservation economy
quickly. Recent gaming successes have masked the fact that many of the 560
federally-recognized tribes are on land inadequate for development and
that Indians as a group still constitute the poorest population group in the
United States. The abolition of the tribal-federal relationship would cost the
states billions of dollars and leave them saddled with responsibility for
pockets of poverty to which-if the Equal Protection Clause under this
Supreme Court means anything like it used to-they would be obligated to
provide the same level of state services as they provide throughout the
state, with little addition to their tax base. It is possible that the dreams of
some states are to sever the tribal connection with the federal government
and divert the federal cash flow for Indian programs to state government.
Such a naked and irresponsible power grab would shock the conscience and
be readily pointed out to Congress and the American people by the tribes.
But the competitive model is not the only one in existence. The Commission
found many examples of healthy, cooperative, and productive state-tribal
relationships throughout the nation, most often in a few selected subject
matter areas rather than across the board. When the Commission was
launched, skeptics said that it was unrealistic to think that tribes could ever
"trust" states or that tribes and states could ever agree on everything. Of
course the Commission was not so naive as to seek unanimity between
tribes and states or to convince these essentially competitive governments
that "trust" was a meaningful goal. The healthy and productive
relationships, it turned out, were those in which the governments each
accepted the permanence and legitimacy of the other and acknowledged
that each government has a zone in which it has exclusive power to set
policy. The settlement of some of the long-pending efforts to define tribal
water rights may have accomplished just that.
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Having mutually accepted the policy-making prerogatives of the
other government, the states and tribes were able to transform their
relationship from a mock-Hobbesian battle to the death to one in which the
issues became those of any other intergovernmental relationship. That is,
efforts previously expended in courts or in lobbying Congress and the
federal executive antagonistically were more usefully employed in a
continuing process of tribal-state interaction. Rather than grousing about
who has the power to set a standard, the governments spend their time
examining the ways in which their interests coincide--economic
development, for example-and the ways in which their interests conflict
(other than the basic competition for power). The assumption that the other
government's power will be used solely to frustrate one's own government
is set aside. Under the competitive model, control is the only issue and any
power in the other government constitutes a fundamental threat. It is the
very existence of an independent policy that is the threat, not what that
policy is ("untaxed and unregulated"), and all actions of the other
government are unacceptable simply because of the very existence of the
other government.
Under a cooperative model, tribal, state, and municipal approaches
to government are compared in a negotiating framework. Some standards
adopted by tribes and states will turn out to be identical, e.g., under a
cooperative approach there is no incentive for a tribe to insist on a 60-mile
per hour speed limit only to resist the state's 55-mile per hour limit. Some
standards will turn out to be different but compatible, e.g., a housing code
that recognizes indigenous building practices and Indian economic needs
on the reservation need not cripple a statewide code more suited to towns
and cities. Tax incentives to encourage investment on the reservation could
help the state economy in the long run and reduce the demand on public
services caused by Indian poverty while having a negligible effect on
immediate state tax revenues. The cooperative model largely resembles any
intergovernmental relationship in this country-state, counties, and
municipalities constantly negotiate and mediate the issues arising from
their independent policy-making postures and constantly seek to improve
cooperation and coordination (or cope with their failure to do so), as tribes,
states, and municipalities do in the best of situations.
Comparative taxation and regulatory standards will not always be
identical or compatible. Some variances between tribal and state standards
will be found to be unacceptable to one or the other government. But
whereas in the competitive model these situations are deemed to be the
norm, i.e., the tribal standard is unacceptable not on the merits but because
it is the tribal standard, they look very different in the cooperative model
in several respects. In the cooperative model, tribal and state standards are
contextualized. Both the tribe and the state are made aware that their areas
of conflicting interests and incompatible standards are muchnarrower than
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they thought when they operated under the competitive model. They are
contextualized in another sense as well. Differences between the
governments are not seen merely as examples of the need to resolve the
power struggle and bring about an "orderly" system, i.e., a system in which
one government makes all the decisions. Instead, disagreements about
policy are seen in the context of a comprehensive intergovernmental
relationship in which many other matters of cooperation and coordination
may be jeopardized by an insistence on control over one issue. Other issues
of importance are likely to make an insistence on dominance in one area not
worth the fight, and compromise can often be reached by concessions in
other areas.
Still and all, there will be times when the importance accorded to
one area of conflict is so great that compromise and cooperation cannot be
achieved. The question is whether this possibility-or likelihood-is a fatal
flaw of the cooperative model. Any approach to conflict prevention or
resolution that purports to resolve all possible problems successfully is
biblical in aspiration, not political. Potential deal breakers cannot be ruled
out in any relationship. In the competitive model, the very existence of two
governments who see their relationship as only competitive and
fundamentally incompatible is the deal breaker. In the cooperative model,
any potential deal breaker is the exception to an otherwise manageable
relationship. As the Commission found, despite the competitive rhetoric of
tribal and state governments at the national and sometimes state level, at
ground level, state, tribes, counties, and municipalities cooperate on a daily
basis with varying degrees of formality on all manner of issues, including
natural resources ones. The dissonance between this fact of reservation
governance and the competitivist rhetoric has fortunately not prevented the
flourishing of intergovernmental cooperation.
One final consideration recommends the cooperative model over
the competitive. In a competitive relationship, as has been repeatedly
stated, it is enough to reject the actions of the other government because
they are the actions of another government. In a cooperative relationship,
both governments are put in a position in which they are expected to give
reasons for their actions and for their disagreements. If the general public
or the federal government are asked to choose between competing tribal
and state views of public policy, they are more likely to make a good choice
if each side is obliged to defend its policy and to give reasons for the
rejection of the alternative policy. This approach allows-in a controlled
setting-an appropriate adversarial relationship not on the primal level of
the government's very right to exist but on the more appropriate level of the
rationale for a particular policy choice.
A persistent issue in evolving Indian law involves the rights of nonIndians affected by tribal law. Because non-Indians cannot participate
directly in the tribal political process, members of Congress, such as former
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Senator Slade Gorton of Washington, and the Supreme Court have
expressed great solicitude for their rights. It is essential to the governmental
aspirations of Indian tribes that this problem be taken seriously not only for
the sake of fundamental fairness but because of the political potency of the
issue and its potential for undermining support for tribal government. On
the one hand, it would obviously destroy the purpose of tribal government
to allow non-members to participate in tribal government on the same basis
as members. There would then be a redundancy between county
governments and tribal governments. On the other hand, the notion
underlying recent Supreme Court jurisprudence in the case of Indian tribes'
"self-government" means governmental power over only members, or
citizens, is so constricted as to render tribal governments virtually impotent.
Any rational concept of self-government must include a reasonable amount
of power to affect any behavior of non-members that affects the tribal
society. That line is being drawn so strictly as to render tribes little more
than landowning membership associations, despite repeated denials by the
Supreme Coure that that is its intent.
The cooperative model of reservation governance does not fully
solve this problem, but it goes a long way toward alleviating and managing
it. Fundamentally, no ultimate solution of the problem is possible as long
as tribal governments maintain their essential character and still seek to
exercise any governmental (rather than proprietary) power over nonIndians. They either participate or they don't. As long as the issue is framed
in the largest, most abstract terms-inclusion in tribal government or
helplessly under its power-it presents the kind of all-or-nothing choice
characteristic of the competitive inter-governmental model. But, in fact, the
cooperative inter-governmental model provides a realistic vehicle for the
representation of non-Indians in the reservation governmental process. To
the degree that tribes seek to cooperate and coordinate with state, county,
and municipal governments, the interests of non-Indian reservation
residents are well represented by these governments. Even in the best of
circumstances tribes will assert power that affects non-Indians in ways that

2 In the mid-1970s, in response to the ill-considered and unrealistic Report of the
American Indian Policy Review Commission, two members of Congress, Meeds and
Cunningham, introduced legislation that would have drastically altered the balance of
governmental power on reservations. The net impact of their legislation would have restricted
tribal power to trust land and tribal members. The legislation failed ignominiously, not
because Congress felt it merely restated the law but because it was considered to be far too
radical a realignment of power on reservations. Ironically, the greatest threat to
intergovernmental stability on reservations today is posed by the United States Supreme
Court. That group of strict constructionists are well along their way to enacting their own
Indian policy in the guise of determining congressional intent, an Indian policy virtually
identical to the Meeds-Cunningham legislation soundly rejected by Congress in 1977.
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arguably affect their fundamental rights despite the best efforts of all
governments to assure otherwise. But the cooperative inter-governmental
model contextualizes these issues in the cases of individuals as it does in the
inter-governmental context, and many of them can be compromised as well.
The final question has to do with how tribes and states can be encouraged
to adopt the cooperative approach to reservation governance. The result of
the Indian gaming legislation shows that Congress cannot bring about
greater inter-governmental cooperation by trying to force tribes to the
bargaining table. In several states, tribes were forced into sham negotiations
in which the states held virtually all the cards and the federal government
stood behind the tribes with the threat that it would close the casinos if the
tribe did not agree to the state's terms.
The single greatest factor promoting the improvement of state-tribal
relations, that is, the success of the cooperative model, is a consistent federal
Indian policy. If Washington holds out no hope to either government that
they can wheedle and cajole changes in federal policy, they accept
responsibility for governing reservation areas and sit down to work out a
relationship that is mutually acceptable, designed by the parties, and
tailored to local conditions. To the degree that the federal government holds
out the false hope to either government that it will realign power, the
incentive of the governments to accept their responsibilities is removed.
At the local level, tribes and states must accept the permanence of
their coexistence. Tribal and state officials alike, appointed as well as
elected, must be judged not only on how well they bluster at each other but
on a more sophisticated level. They must justify the need for conflict as the
failure of all attempts to cooperate and coordinate, not as some primitive
instinct.
Future natural resource issues involving Indian tribes will be as
complex as those in the larger society and may very much resemble them.
They can appear to be examples of unreason and overreaching. They will
surely from time to time shatter stereotypes. But, properly considered, they
can be far from unmanageable. The management of natural resources is
fundamentally political. Once everyone recognizes that tribal governments
sit at the same table as the state and federal governments, mutually
beneficial natural resource management can begin.

